Financial Stress and Economic Contractions

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January 2010
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\textbf{A R T I C L E   I N F O}

\textbf{Article history:}
Received 22 June 2009
Received in revised form 7 January 2010
Accepted 12 January 2010
Available online 22 January 2010

\textbf{JEL classification:}
E5
E6
F3
G2
G14

\textbf{Keywords:}
Financial crises
Financial stress index
Financial systems
Recessions
Slowdowns

\textbf{ABSTRACT}

This paper examines why some financial stress episodes lead to economic downturns. The paper identifies episodes of financial turmoil in advanced economies using a financial stress index (FSI), and proposes an analytical framework to assess the impact of financial stress— in particular banking distress— on the real economy. It concludes that financial turmoil characterized by banking distress is more likely to be associated with deeper and longer downturns than stress mainly in securities or foreign exchange markets. Economies with more arm's-length financial systems seem to be more exposed to contractions in activity following financial stress, due to the greater procyclicality of leverage in their banking systems.

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1. Introduction

With the financial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007 mutating into a full-blown crisis, encompassing broader securities markets and the banking systems of several advanced economies, a key concern is how macroeconomic activity will be affected going forward, and what policymakers can do both to reduce the economic consequences of this crisis and forestall such crises in the future.\textsuperscript{1} Past episodes of stress in banking, securities and/or foreign exchange markets have only sometimes been associated with economic downturns (Fig. 1). However, these downturns have tended to be more severe (Fig. 2). In trying to understand the impact of financial stress on economic activity more generally, it is important to recognize that despite the evolution of financial systems through innovation and regulatory changes, the concept of “financial cycles” has been a constant feature of the economic landscape. Financial systems tend to be inherently procyclical, with growth in credit, leverage, and asset prices often reinforcing the underlying economic dynamic—and in some cases leading to a build up of financial imbalances followed by a sharp correction (see Borio, 2007; Goodhart, 1996; Minsky, 1992).

The impact of financial cycles on the real economy, however, remains a matter of debate in both academic and policy circles. One strand of research has emphasized the role of the financial accelerator in amplifying the effects of financial cycles on the real economy due to the effects of changes in the values of collateral on the willingness of the financial system to provide credit to the economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In this view, shocks that affect the creditworthiness of borrowers tend to accentuate swings in output. Another branch of inquiry, focusing on lenders’ balance sheets, has examined the role of bank capital in affecting aggregate credit, the so-called bank capital channel.\textsuperscript{2} If bank capital is eroded, banks become more reluctant to lend and may be forced to deleverage, leading to sharper economic downturns. Finally, the literature has

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\textsuperscript{1} For some further insights regarding the recent crisis, see White (2008), Hildebrand (2008), and Ackermann (2008).

\textsuperscript{2} Which is also related to the banking lending channel—for further details on both see Bernanke and Lown (1991), Kashyap and Stein (1995), Gambacorta et al. (2007), Diamond and Rajan (2000), and Van den Heuvel (2002).
Episodes of financial turmoil are identified using a novel index based on high-frequency price variables that can signal stress stemming from banking, securities, or foreign exchange markets. The FSI not only accurately captures financial stress periods identified in the literature, but also identifies periods of stress not associated with downturns. One of the main advantages of the financial stress indicator developed in this paper is that it is based on a uniform set of indicators across the 17 advanced economies, and therefore facilitates cross-country analysis.

Using the FSI, the paper proposes an analytical framework to assess the impact of financial stress – in particular banking distress – on the real economy. Specifically, the paper attempts to draw lessons from these episodes by differentiating them on the basis of the preconditions that were in place at the time that the financial stress episode began, including the state of household and firm balance sheets, the dynamics of credit and asset prices in the run up to the stress episode, the type of financial stress episode (i.e., to what extent was the stress related to banks, securities markets, or foreign exchange markets), and the policy responses that characterized these episodes. Taken together, these factors provide a comprehensive view of the channels and mechanisms through which financial stress affects economic cycles. While establishing the causality between financial stress and economic downturns poses an inherently difficult challenge, the analysis in the paper makes an attempt to address this issue by explicitly accounting for the effect of the most common types of shocks studied in the macroeconomic literature.

The key findings of the paper are as follows:

- First, episodes of financial turmoil characterized by banking distress are more likely to be associated with deeper and longer downturns than episodes of stress mainly in securities or foreign exchange markets.
- Second, and related to the first point, recessions associated with banking-related financial stress tend to last at least twice as long as recessions not preceded by financial stress.
- Third, the likelihood that financial stress will be followed by a downturn appears to be associated with the extent to which house prices and aggregate credit rise in the period before the financial stress. Moreover, a greater reliance on external financing by households and non-financial corporates is associated with a sharper downturn in the aftermath of financial stress.
- Fourth, countries with more arm’s-length financial systems seem to be somewhat more vulnerable to sharper contractions in activity in the event of banking stress. This is because leverage in the banking systems appears to be more procyclical in countries that have progressed further in terms of financial innovation.
- Fifth, the importance of core financial intermediaries in the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy suggests that within strong financial stability frameworks policies that help restore the capital base of these institutions can help alleviate downturns.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section elaborates the concept of financial stress that is employed in this paper and uses this concept to identify episodes of financial stress from 1980 to 2007. The paper then analyzes the behavior of economic cycles in the aftermath of financial stress episodes.

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3 The countries included in this study are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

4 This broader approach complements other recent research on the empirical relationship between asset prices – such as for equity and house prices and bond spreads – and the dynamics of output during the course of the business cycle (see, for example, Claessens et al., 2009; Lall et al., 2008) or between bank capital, lending and output (see Kashyap et al., 2008, in the context of the United States).
The section that follows discusses the factors that differentiate those stress episodes that were associated with economic slowdowns and recessions from those that were not, with emphasis on the characteristics of the financial stress episodes and the initial conditions in credit, asset prices, and household and corporate balance sheets. The subsequent section complements the macro-level analysis by analyzing the procyclicality of investment and commercial banks leverage in both arm’s length and relationship-based financial systems, using bank-level data. Based on the analysis of the preceding sections, we discuss the recovery patterns, and then in the penultimate section analyze six well-known episodes of banking-related financial stress across the set of advanced economies considered in this paper, and places the current financial turmoil in historical context. The final section concludes with some implications for policy.

2. Identifying episodes of financial stress

Throughout history, financial systems — encompassing both financial institutions and the channels of intermediation — have been prone to periods of rapid expansion followed by corrections. To understand the impact of financial cycles on the economy, particularly at the current conjuncture, it is useful to identify the key features of the ongoing turmoil in financial markets and then look for earlier episodes of financial stress that share common features with the current one.

The current episode began in early-2007 as a generally orderly repricing of risk for assets linked to U.S. subprime mortgages, but by the summer had rapidly escalated into a severe liquidity squeeze in the banking systems in the United States and Western Europe, and serious dislocations in the interbank funding market. More recently, the crisis mutated into one where heavy credit losses raised questions about the capital strength of many banks. Moreover, the stress has spread across various market segments — marked by a loss of liquidity, falling valuations, rising risk aversion, and heightened volatility — in emerging as well as advanced economies. Foreign exchange markets have also been affected by heightened uncertainty about the safety and soundness of financial assets and the impact of financial stress on economic performance. Against this background, any characterization of financial stress episodes should take into account conditions in the banking sector, the state of non-bank intermediation through equity and bonds, and the behavior of foreign exchange markets.

The academic literature on financial crises has largely relied on historical narratives of crisis episodes, such as well-known cases of systemic banking crises where bank capital was eroded and lending was disrupted, often requiring significant public intervention (see, for example, Caprio and Klingebiel, 2006). An extension of this approach is to augment the episodes of banking crises with those of currency crises, where reserves were depleted and/or there was a significant change in the exchange rate mechanisms (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2003). Pure securities market stress episodes, especially on a cross-country basis, have not been examined as comprehensively, although studies for single countries are instructive (Shiller, 1999).

While historical approaches to identifying financial crises have provided a rich database of episodes, they are less well suited for the purposes of this paper for a number of reasons. First, these episodes are the ones that in retrospect were known to have large output consequences and/or required significant public intervention, and less attention has been given to “near misses” that could serve as useful counterfactuals—episodes of financial stress with little macroeconomic impact. Second, the identified episodes are typically of considerable duration and cover stresses of varying intensity, making it difficult to identify when financial stress peaked, and whether an economic downturn can meaningfully be linked to the financial stress episode. Finally, by focusing on banking crises and currency crises, even the most comprehensive databases pay little attention to pure securities market stresses or liquidity squeezes (such as around the stock market crash of 1987 and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998). If leverage in banking systems is linked to securitization, it would appear important to analyze the banking and securities channels of intermediation jointly to determine the degree of interaction between these channels.

2.1. The financial stress index

To overcome these drawbacks, this paper identifies episodes of financial stress as extreme values of a composite variable — the FSI — built using market-based indicators in real time and high frequency. Related indices have been developed by Illing and Liu (2006) for Canada, Hakkio and Keeton (2009) for the United States, and by private sector experts (for example, BCA Research in the case of the United States). The FSI for each country is constructed as a variance-weighted average of three subindices which can be thought of being associated with the banking, securities, and foreign exchange markets, with an increase of the FSI indicating elevated financial stress. At the outset, it should be noted that while the underlying FSI components are in monthly frequency, a quarterly index is constructed to facilitate comparisons with quarterly macroeconomic data by taking averages. While the details are explained in Appendix A, an overview of the components of the index is as follows:

Banking-related subindex components:

- The slope of the yield curve, which is measured here as the difference between the short- and long-term yields on government issued securities — sometimes also referred to as the inverted term spread. Banks generate income by intermediating short-term liabilities (deposits) into longer-term assets (loans). Therefore, when there is a negative term spread — that is a negative sloping yield curve — bank profitability is seriously jeopardized.
- The TED spread, which is measured here as the difference between interbank rates and the yield on Treasury bills, captures the premium banks charge each other over treasury bill rates, and is a proxy for counterparty risk.
- The beta of banking sector, which is a measure of the correlation between the total returns to the banking-sector stock index and the overall stock market index. In line with the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM), a beta greater than one — indicating that banking stocks move more than proportionately than the overall stock market — suggests that the banking sector is relatively risky. For the purposes of the paper, the beta is recorded as a non-zero value only during periods when returns are negative to focus on adverse shocks to banks. Accordingly, in high stress episodes this indicator would reflect an unusually large drop of banking stock prices relative to market prices.

Securities market-related subindex components:

- Corporate bond spreads measured as the difference between corporate bond yields minus long-term government bond yields. The spread is used to proxy risk in the corporate debt market. This

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5 See Kindleberger et al. (2005) for a history of financial crises. A well-known exposition of this procyclical feature of financial systems is Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1992).
spread incorporates credit, market, and liquidity risk premiums. While credit risk is a function of expected loss, the other two elements are a function of risk and uncertainty.

- Stock market returns measured as the monthly return, but with multiplied by \(-1\) so that a decline in stock prices registers as an increase in the index.
- Time-varying stock return volatility derived from a GARCH(1,1) specification (for further details, see Bollerslev et al., 1992). This series is used to capture the observation that many asset prices tend to exhibit volatility clustering, especially when financial markets are in a state of uncertainty.

Foreign exchange-related subindex component:

- Time-varying volatility of monthly changes in the nominal effective exchange rate, also derived from a GARCH(1,1) specification.

There are many other potential candidates for inclusion in the FSI, but given the cross-country nature of this study, one objective was to use a uniform set of time series across all 17 countries. Another objective was parsimony: we wanted to use a minimum set of time series that would signal financial stress episodes. Adding tends to be restricted owing to data availability, both across time and country dimensions. It could also potentially contaminate the FSI with noisy indicators. Further, because of common components, among other things, the qualitative patterns of many financial series are similar (many measures of volatility and premiums increase during financial stress episodes). Therefore, the marginal informative content of additional series diminishes quite rapidly.

The FSI can be custom tailored for an individual country, and this would be a natural extension for country-specific case studies. While more series will surely improve the informational content of the country-specific index, this would also complicate the signal extraction problem. With these considerations in mind, it is also important to emphasize that, as we elaborate further below, the FSI is quite robust in capturing the main financial stress episodes documented in narrative descriptions and in the literature.

As discussed above, the FSI developed in this paper is based on a uniform set of indicators across the 17 advanced economies we study. Therefore, in contrast with country-specific stress indices, our FSI facilitates consistent cross-country analysis. As mentioned above, one of the indicators of financial stress was developed by Illing and Liu (2006) for the Bank of Canada. More recently, Hakkio and Keeton (2009) propose a stress index for the United States. These two indices have an advantage in that they use financial data from more advanced and deeper financial systems (for example, the spread between off-the-run and on-the-run U.S. Treasury spreads). However, at the same time, because such markets may not exist, these indices are not readily adaptable to many other countries.

In the context of our FSI, the advantage of utilizing such an index is its ability to identify the beginning and peaks of financial stress episodes more precisely, that is, the specific quarter of a year when an episode can be said to have begun, and its duration. Moreover, constructing such an index facilitates the identification of four fundamental characteristics of financial stress events: large shifts in asset prices (stock and bond market returns); an abrupt increase in risk/uncertainty (stock and foreign exchange volatility); abrupt shifts in liquidity (TED spreads); and the health of the banking system (the beta of banking-sector stocks and the yield curve, which affects the profitability of intermediating short-term liabilities into long-term assets). Looking at these subcomponents can help identify which types of financial stress (banking-related, securities market related, currency related, or a combination of these) have been associated with larger output consequences.

While the corporate finance literature might suggest using a quantity-based index in order to identify periods when the financial sector is under strain and its ability to intermediate may be impaired, this paper's strategy of using financial market (asset price-based) variables has four major advantages. First, asset price-based variables are easy to monitor and compute on a comparable basis across a large set of countries. Second, movements in broader financial asset prices can be expected to play a greater role in the ability of financial firms to supply intermediation services than in the ability of specific non-financial corporates to fund new investment, which is much more closely tied to developments in their sector. Third, asset prices are observable continuously, while quantity variables are only observed with a lag. Therefore, price-based indices are more useful from a policy perspective, particularly in the context of financial sector surveillance. Fourth, it is useful to initially consider a broad range of financial stress events based on asset prices, and then use quantity-based variables to identify when financial stress episodes are associated with a significant economic impact. The underlying hypothesis is that, within the universe of asset price-based stress episodes, only some reflect true underlying distress in the balance sheets of financial intermediaries that have an economic impact by restricting the supply of credit, while others merely reflect normal market corrections.

Using the seven subcomponents described above, the FSI is constructed for each of the 17 countries in the sample. Episodes of financial stress are identified as those periods when the index for a country is more than one standard deviation above its trend. These episodes signal that one or more of the banking, securities and/or foreign exchange market subcomponents has shifted abruptly.

The trend is identified using the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter, and serves two fundamental purposes: first, because it is a time-varying trend, it captures the notion that financial systems have been evolving. This is useful because the financial stress may manifest itself in different ways across time and across evolving financial systems. Second, the HP filter is used for each country, and thereby picks up country-specific factors not explicitly captured by the index—it could be thought of a time-varying fixed-effect term, which is useful given the cross-country nature of our analysis.

The foundation of our empirical investigation is based on an event analysis. The FSI was used to identify the events: episodes of financial stress. The event study methodology can be traced back to Fama et al. (1969), which measured the impact of certain events on security prices. Given the quality and quantity of financial data, financial economics was a fertile area of research where event studies have also been used in macroeconomics in general, particularly in the field of international economics. For example, event studies have been used in analyzing currency crises in emerging markets (Frankel and Rose, 1996), or for example, towards assessing the implications of current account dynamics (Edwards, 2007, and Freund, 2005).

### 2.2. Episodes of financial stress

Overall, 113 financial stress episodes were identified by the FSI in the sample of countries considered in this paper over the last 30 years (Table 1). Of these episodes, 43 were mainly driven by stress in the banking sector – the banking variables accounted for the large portion of the increase of the FSI during these episodes – 50 episodes mainly reflected turmoil in the securities market, and 20 in the foreign exchange market. In some cases, importantly, stresses beginning in one segment eventually encompassed the other segments of the financial system. For example, in 17 of the episodes that mainly reflected stress in securities or foreign exchange markets, the banking variables accounted for at least one-
third of the spike in the FSI. Adding these episodes implies there are 60 episodes with “banking-related” financial stress in the sample, that is, episodes were banks were either the dominant or the second largest factor, with a contribution of at least one-third of the rise in the spike.

In the context of the current turmoil, the FSI indicates that the financial crisis that began in 2007 has a significant global dimension, affecting virtually all countries in the sample (Figs. 3 and 4). Earlier episodes of financial stress affecting the majority of countries in the sample simultaneously include the 1987 stock market crash, the high yield market collapse in the late-1980s, the Scandinavian banking crisis, the ERM crisis and the collapse of LTCM, but the current episode appears to be felt most widely. Overall, the index appears to capture global financial episodes accurately.\textsuperscript{6}

The FSI also accurately captures the fact that while the origins of the current episode were in the banking sector, by early-2008 the crises had become much more broad based, affecting banking, securities and foreign exchange markets at the same time (Fig. 6). Moreover, the evidence also indicates that past episodes of banking stress appear to have had a significant securities market component.

Looking in detail at the country-specific FSI, for the set of countries considered in this paper the peaks of the FSI – corresponding to periods of financial stress – generally overlap accurately with well-known financial stress episodes in these countries over the past three decades, including the most recent episode (see Fig. 3). In fact, an important criterion that was used to gauge the robustness and reliability of the FSI was to ensure that periods of stress signaled by the FSI corresponded to episodes of financial stress in country-specific narratives, which may not have been associated with crises. As an example, we once again cite the 1987 stock market crash, which was clearly an episode of acute financial stress, but not associated with a recession in the United States. Furthermore, we held the FSI to an even more rigorous standard in that we wanted to pick up financial crises highlighted in the literature based on papers which include Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Caprio and Klingebiel (2006), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006), Edison (2003), Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) – which cover banking, currency, and other crises, but also stock and house price boom and busts. More concretely, comparing the FSI-based episodes with the episodes of financial crisis identified in the literature suggests that the index captures over 90 percent of the banking crises and over 80 percent of the currency crises episodes, when the duration of the episodes identified in the literature is interpreted narrowly.\textsuperscript{7}

While the paper remains agnostic on the causes of spikes in the FSI, given that spikes in the FSI appear to be associated with well-known events such as stock/bond market collapses or banking crises, is the index perhaps a mirror of other fundamentals that can directly affect the economic cycle? Considering four such shocks, namely to oil prices, labor productivity, monetary policy, and fiscal policy, the evidence indicates that spikes in the FSI are not correlated with oil, productivity, or fiscal shocks (Fig. 5).\textsuperscript{8} While there appears to be greater correlation with monetary policy, this is expected given that monetary policy (as measured by the term spread) is a subcomponent of the index itself, included because financial stress appears to be associated with the stance of monetary policy as reflected in the term spread.

Overall, these results suggest that the FSI can be considered a comprehensive indicator that successfully identifies the main episodes of financial stress for the sample of countries under consideration and can provide the basis for an examination of the macroeconomic consequences of such stress.

### 3. Financial stress, economic slowdowns, and recessions

Having identified episodes of financial stress, a first question of interest is: how many of these episodes were followed by an economic slowdown or outright recession? Were economic downturns preceded by episodes of financial stress different from those that were not? It should be emphasized that the focus of this paper is on identifying the main characteristics of financial stress episodes

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\textsuperscript{6} Overall, of the 113 episodes of financial stress identified in the sample, 87 episodes simultaneously affected two or more countries. The working paper version contains narratives of some of the major episodes of financial stress spanning the early-1980s to present (Appendix A).

\textsuperscript{7} Furthermore, the FSI captures 100 percent of all episodes identified in the literature if the duration of episodes is interpreted more broadly, that is, if the window around the quarter of financial stress identified by the FSI is expanded by a few quarters.

\textsuperscript{8} Mirroring the definition of financial stress episodes, oil price or labor productivity “shocks” are defined as cases where changes in the oil price or labor productivity are one standard deviation above trend; fiscal policy “shocks” are defined as episodes where the government net lending/borrowing ratio to GDP is one standard deviation above trend; and finally monetary policy “shocks” are defined as cases where the inverse term spread is one standard deviation above trend. In all cases, the deviations from trend are calculated using Hodrick–Prescott filters. It should be noted that “shocks” were used for a lack of a better term—these could also be interpreted as macroeconomic surprises and/or (unanticipated) important outliers.
that were eventually followed by economic downturns, rather than on assessing whether financial stress "causes" economic downturns, given the significant analytical and empirical challenges in establishing causality. Nevertheless, the analysis will attempt to control to some extent for other shocks – namely, monetary, fiscal, oil price, and labor productivity shocks – that may affect the link between financial stress and economic cycles.

To answer these questions the following two definitions of economic downturns are used:

- An episode of financial stress is followed by an economic slowdown if the level of real GDP falls below trend (identified using the Hodrick-Prescott filter) within six quarters of the onset of the financial stress episode.
- An episode of financial stress is followed by a recession if there was an acute contraction in activity within six quarters of the onset of the financial stress episode.

Slowdowns are milder downturns than recessions. The rule of thumb for dating recessions is two consecutive quarters of negative growth. However, we utilize a more precise definition based on the business cycle turning point dating methodology formalized by Harding and Pagan (2002), who demonstrate that their algo-

\[ \text{Fig. 3. The financial stress index. Source: Authors' calculations.} \]

\[ \text{Fig. 4. Share of countries experiencing financial stress. Source: Authors' calculations.} \]
rithm accurately captures the peaks and troughs identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) itself in the United States. For the United States we took the dates provided by the NBER, but for the other countries we used the Harding and Pagan (2002) algorithm to date the business cycle turning points.\(^{10}\) The turning points we identified were in line with other studies as well as those generated by private sector experts.\(^{11}\)

Based upon these definitions, of the 113 financial stress episodes identified in the previous section, 29 were followed by a slowdown, and 29 by recessions. The remaining 55 financial stress episodes were not followed by an economic downturn (Table 2 and Fig. 1, Fig. 6).

The median time lag between the onset of financial stress and the slowdown/recession that follows was about two quarters, although this masks substantial variation in the sample—about half of the slowdown/recessions occurred within a quarter of the beginning of the financial stress, but for one in four episodes it took more than a year for a downturn to materialize after the financial stress (Fig. 7).

Most importantly, median cumulative output losses (relative to trend for slowdowns or until recovery for recessions) in downturns that follow financial stresses were about 2.8 percent of GDP for slowdowns and about 4.4 percent of GDP for recessions, significantly (at least at the 10 percent level) larger than in episodes of slowdowns and recessions that were not preceded by financial stress (about 1.6 and 2.3 percent, respectively), as shown in Fig. 2 and Table 2. Therefore, the output loss for downturns preceded by financial stress is almost twice as large when compared to other downturns. This result mainly reflects the longer duration of slowdowns and recessions when preceded by financial stress.

What is particularly striking is the difference between banking-related and non-banking-related financial stress episodes. As

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\(^{10}\) For example, in the United States, the most recent recession was in 2001 while the most recent slowdown was when GDP fell below trend during 2007:Q4–2008:Q1.

\(^{11}\) The turning point dates were compared with Morsink et al. (2002), as well as dates identified by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (www.businesscycle.com)—dates used in this paper are available from authors upon request.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics on financial stress, slowdowns, and recessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Duration (average; quarters)</th>
<th>Output loss (average; percent of GDP)</th>
<th>Number of quarters after start of FS to slowdown or recession (average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial stress (FS)</td>
<td>Slowdown or recession*</td>
<td>Cumulativeb Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stress</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stress with slowdown</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>–7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking relatedc</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>–9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>–14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-banking relatedc</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>–4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stress with recession</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>–13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking relatedd</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>–19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>–9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-banking relatedd</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>–5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowdown not preceded by financial stressd</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>5.1*</td>
<td>–4.1*</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recession not preceded by financial stressf</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.1*</td>
<td>–5.4*</td>
<td>–0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations.

a Slowdown: number of quarters where GDP is below trend; recession: number of quarters until GDP is at or exceeds peak level.
b Slowdown: cumulative output loss below trend; recession: cumulative output loss until recovery.
c For financial stress episodes associated with slowdowns, financial stress duration, cumulative output loss, and average output loss are statistically different when banking-related and non-banking-related episodes are compared (at the 0.02, 0.09, and 0.06 significance levels, respectively).
d For financial stress episodes associated with recessions, cumulative output loss and average output loss are statistically different when banking-related and non-banking-related episodes are compared (0.10 and 0.07 significance levels, respectively).
e Asterisks indicate difference from slowdowns preceded by financial stress significant at 10 percent.
f Asterisks indicate difference from recessions preceded by financial stress significant at 10 percent.

shown in Table 2, there is a marked distinction between the cumulative output losses between the two types of financial stress episodes—especially for banking-related stress episodes associated with recessions. It is also worth noting that the differences between these cumulative output losses contrasting banking-related and non-banking-related stress episodes associated with either slowdowns or recessions is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.

Looking at the dynamics of selected macroeconomic variables around the beginning of the downturn reveals that, in general, the

Fig. 6. Descriptive statistics for financial stress episodes. Contribution of banking, securities, and foreign exchange (the sum of the components equals the level of the financial stress index in the given period). Source: Authors’ calculations.
to episodes that may be outliers. Then, we employ non-parametric tests based on the work by Wilcoxon (1945) and Mann and Whitney (1947) which tests the null hypothesis that the two groups were drawn from populations with the same median. The rank-based non-parametric test is based on the comparison of the number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup, and is sometimes referred to as the median test (Conover, 1980). Under the null hypothesis, the median chi-squared test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom in the case of two subgroups. If the null is rejected at the 10 percent level or better, then the test indicates that the difference between the medians across the two groups of episodes is genuinely different.  

3.1. Why are some financial stress episodes associated with economic slowdowns?  

The previous section has shown that only about half of the episodes of financial stress identified in this paper were followed by economic slowdowns or recessions. What determines the likelihood that financial stress episodes are going to be followed by economic downturns? What characterizes the most severe and prolonged of these downturns?  

In order to answer these questions, this section compares the financial stress episodes followed by economic downturns to those that were associated with a decline in economic activity along two dimensions: first, the characteristics of the episode itself, that is, the nature of the financial “shock,” and second, the financial position of financial intermediaries, households, and firms at the beginning of the episode.  

3.2. Is banking-related financial stress different?  

An analysis of the episodes suggests that banking system stress tends to be associated with larger output consequences than episodes of pure securities or foreign exchange market stresses, where the banking system remains largely unaffected. Around 60 percent of the episodes of financial stress followed by slowdowns or recessions are banking-related. Moreover banking-related financial stress episodes are followed by deeper economic slowdowns (Figs. 10 and 11) compared with other types of financial stress episodes. In fact, the difference between banking-related and non-banking-related episodes is significant at a minimum of 10 percent for the quarters where the largest discrepancy is visible (namely quarters zero to four). Table 2 suggests that both slowdowns and recessions preceded by banking-related stress tend to last longer, and are associated with larger average GDP losses, than those preceded by different types of financial stress, or indeed no financial stress at all. 

An analysis of the financial stress episodes in the sample also shows that bank asset growth slows significantly in banking-related financial stress episodes followed by economic downturns compared with other types of financial stress episodes not associated with slowdowns or recessions (Fig. 12). While normal economic downturns can be expected to be associated with a fall in the demand for credit, episodes of banking-related financial stress associated with subsequent slowdowns/recessions had also signifi-
Fig. 9. Selected macrovariables around economic downturns with and without financial stress (median; start of economic contraction at $t = 0$; quarters on the $x$-axis). Source: Authors’ calculations.

Fig. 10. Banking-related financial stress and growth. Financial stress (real GDP percent change from 1 year ago, median). Source: Authors’ calculations.

Fig. 11. Banking-related financial stress, slowdowns, and recessions. Slowdowns and recessions (real GDP percent change from a year ago). Source: Authors’ calculations.
significantly higher cost of capital after the episode began (Fig. 12).\textsuperscript{15} It is also important to point out that the differences between these groups is statistically significant. In particular, the growth in bank assets and the cost of capital for the recessions contrasted with the financial stress episodes that were not associated with downturns (“Other”) is statistically significant at the 5 percent level of better.\textsuperscript{16} While the issue of reverse causality between recessions and financial stress is difficult to address empirically, suggesting appropriate caution in interpreting these results, these findings are consistent with the view that that a reduction in the supply of credit – a credit crunch – is a key factor associating banking-related financial stress episodes to economic slowdowns and recessions.

3.3. Financial imbalances and firm and household financial exposure

After looking at the nature of the shocks, the focus now shifts to whether the likelihood of a downturn in economic activity following financial stress depends on initial conditions in terms of asset prices and balance sheets. The evidence suggests that initial conditions are important in determining the economic impact of a financial shock:

- Both house prices and the credit-to-GDP ratio tend to rise significantly faster during the upswing of the financial cycle in those stress episodes that eventually are followed by slowdowns or recessions (Fig. 13). Statistical tests confirm that financial turmoil is more likely to be followed by economic slowdown or outright recession when it is preceded by a more rapid buildup in house prices and credit as shown in Fig. 14.\textsuperscript{17} For example, each of the variables measuring the initial conditions of financial stress episodes are statistically different when followed by a recession as compared to those that were not (“Other”) at the 5 percent level or better.
- Episodes of financial stress followed by economic slowdowns and recessions tend to be characterized by firms being more heavily dependent on external sources of funding – that is, with higher net borrowing ratios – in the run up to the financial stress episode (see Figs. 13 and 14).\textsuperscript{18} Such a higher initial reliance on external funding makes firms more vulnerable to a downswing of the financial cycle, and sets the stage for a larger impact on the real economy as firms are forced to adjust their spending plans more drastically in the aftermath of financial stress.

To investigate the role of initial financial imbalances and firms and households’ reliance on external funding in explaining the severity of the ensuing economic downturn more formally, the cumulative loss of output in the aftermath of financial stress episodes is regressed on the run up in credit and assets prices before the onset of the financial stress, firms and households’ net borrow-

\textsuperscript{15} The cost of capital is defined here as a weighted average of the real cost of equity, the real cost of debt, and real lending rates, using as weights the relative shares of equity, bonds, and loans in non-financial corporate liabilities. See Appendix A for details.

\textsuperscript{16} “Other” refers to all financial stress episodes not followed by slowdowns or recessions. In addition, we also used an alternative definition of “Other” whereby we only included non-banking-related stress episodes either followed by slowdowns and recession. The results are qualitatively very similar, but statistical significance changes. Regarding bank assets, when banking-related financial stress episodes followed by slowdowns or recessions, the statistical significance is 15 and 13 percent, respectively. Turning to the cost of capital, the same comparison reveals that differences between slowdowns is statistically insignificant, whereas differences between banking- and non-banking-related recessions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

\textsuperscript{17} Asset prices, namely real house and stock prices, are measured as deviations from their respective Hodrick–Prescott trends in line with many studies in the literature, especially those focusing on credit booms—see for example, Cardarelli et al. (2008, 2009) for a recent overview regarding house prices, and Mendoza and Terrones (2008) regarding credit booms.

\textsuperscript{18} Net lending (or borrowing, when in deficit) of a sector is a standard national accounts concept and can be measured either through incomes and expenditures or through financial transactions. Under the income and expenditure approach, net lending is the difference between internally generated funds and outlays on non-financial capital. A sector’s net lending equals its saving, plus its capital consumption allowance and net capital transfers from non-residents, less its investment in fixed capital and inventories (the excess of net acquisitions of financial assets by transactions over their net incurrences of liabilities). Net lending (or borrowing) is also referred to as sector surplus (or deficit).
Fig. 13. Selected macrovariables around financial stress episodes (median; start of financial stress episode at $t = 0$; x-axis as stated). Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: All in real terms, except for household and non-financial corporate net lending ratios. The sample is constant for all quarters and years.

- Firms’ net borrowing ratio at the onset of the financial stress episode enters significantly in almost all specifications, confirming the importance of the link between initial firms’ reliance on external credit and the severity of the decline in economic activity.

- The household net borrowing ratio at the onset of the financial stress episode is statistically significant when considered alone, but loses significance when firms’ net borrowing position is added. In this case, though it continues affecting the severity of the output losses when interacted with the duration of the financial episode, suggesting that household position matters especially when the economy is hit by a sustained financial “shock.”

3.4. On the linkages between financial stress and downturns

Since this paper tries to address the factors that determine whether or not financial stress is followed by a downturn, a key challenge is to determine the origins of the shocks that hit the economy and that subsequently set off the complex interactions between the real and financial sectors. In identifying periods of financial stress, which are interpreted as exogenous shocks to the financial sector, it is useful to ask whether financial stress leads to deeper and more protracted downturns? As inferred from Fig. 11, slowdowns preceded by banking-related financial stress are indeed
more severe than episodes not preceded by financial stress, while the differences for recessions are smaller. Table 2 elaborates further on these differences and also discusses statistical significance.

However, the observation that financial sector stress precedes an economic downturn still does not necessarily mean that financial stress has been the key driving factor of subsequently observed real sector developments: since financial market participants are forward looking, the financial stress may merely be a manifestation of their anticipation of a fundamental deterioration in the real sector environment. To address this problem, the paper considers four shocks that could be considered mainly fundamental, exogenous deteriorations in the real sector environment: oil price shocks, labor productivity shocks, and two policy shocks, namely monetary and fiscal policy. As shown in Fig. 15, any one of these four shocks combined with financial stress brings about a more severe downturn in contrast to just the shock on its own. Reinforcing this point, we find that the largest differences between the series preceded by financial stress and the shock versus the series only preceded by the shock is statistically significant at the 10 percent level of better. This suggests that financial stress probably has a separately identifiable impact, which could be attributed to, among other things, to financial accelerator mechanisms as discussed in Bernanke et al. (1999), Iacoviello (2005), or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), as well as bank capital effects (see, for example, Van den Heuvel, 2002).

4. Financial innovation, financial stress, and economic cycles

The continued importance of banks in explaining why certain financial stress episodes are associated with greater output consequences leads to the question of why banks remain crucial despite financial innovation and the emergence of non-bank sources of funding.

Financial innovation could reduce the pivotal role of banks by providing an alternative channel for firms and households to access financing, one that depends less on the collateral constraints faced by borrowers and the adverse impact of financial stresses on the cost of capital for banks. However, while the role of banks has evolved over time, their symbiotic relationship with markets remains an essential feature of financial systems, especially those characterized by a prevalence of arm’s-length financing (see Lall et
Table 3

Cross-section regressions (the role of financial stress duration).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration of financial stress</td>
<td>1.324 (0.100)</td>
<td>1.591 (0.100)</td>
<td>0.641 (0.430)</td>
<td>1.023 (0.330)</td>
<td>0.963 (0.300)</td>
<td>1.377 (0.090)</td>
<td>1.034 (0.200)</td>
<td>0.888 (0.070)</td>
<td>0.711 (0.300)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real interest rates</td>
<td>0.890 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.808 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.835 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.877 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.870 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.841 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.887 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.869 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-financial corporation net borrowing ratio</td>
<td>1.050 (0.100)</td>
<td>0.480 (0.440)</td>
<td>0.668 (0.330)</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household net borrowing ratio</td>
<td>14.304 (0.010)</td>
<td>−0.785 (0.720)</td>
<td>−0.593 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.561 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.136 (0.480)</td>
<td>0.329 (0.430)</td>
<td>0.727 (0.780)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.850)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit ratio</td>
<td>1.070 (0.020)</td>
<td>1.439 (0.070)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Household net borrowing ratio × duration</td>
<td>0.229 (0.430)</td>
<td>0.136 (0.480)</td>
<td>−0.367</td>
<td>−0.727 (0.780)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.850)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.850)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.040)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.014 (0.450)</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.093 (0.790)</td>
<td>0.270 (0.330)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.850)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.850)</td>
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Notes: p-values in parentheses.

Authors' calculations.

Source: Robust

4.2. Financial systems and leverage

To explain the continuing importance of banks, it is revealing to look in more detail at the procyclical behavior of bank leverage around financial cycles. In particular, how banks manage their leverage during upturns and downturns in the financial

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21 Banks increasingly depend on market-based funding sources to finance their assets (such as through their off-balance sheet commercial paper programs). Conversely, investment and now increasingly commercial banks also remain at the center of the originate-to-distribute model of securitized financing, and provide credit to hedge funds and other leveraged intermediaries through repurchase facilities to invest in securities markets.
cycle appears to be key in explaining why banking stress translates into lower credit supply, a higher cost of capital, and a softening of economic activity. The hypothesis is that when banks overextend their balance sheets on the back of higher asset values and lower perceived risk during booms, this leads to a build up of financial imbalances while supporting a rapid expansion in activity, boosting asset values further, reducing perceived risk, and fostering another round of lending and economic expansion. Subsequently, a financial shock that either increases risk or reduces the return on assets could prompt a cycle of severe deleveraging, with banks sharply reducing their lending (or their growth in lending) as bank capital falls, prompting an economic slowdown that feeds back into a further reduction in credit supply.

This procyclicality of leverage is likely to be more pronounced in financial systems where banks are more exposed to fluctuations in market values of assets—through their holdings of securities and their repurchase facilities, for example. As this behavior is typical of non-depository financial intermediaries, one should expect to see evidence of procyclical leverage especially for investment banks (Shin, 2008). On the other hand, commercial banks should be less prone to procyclically adjusting their balance sheets during asset price or liquidity booms and busts, as they rely less on wholesale funding and more on retail deposits, and are also less subject to mark-to-market changes in their asset values.

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22 This is in line with Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis.

23 It is important to note that in a systemic crisis it will still be difficult for all banks to adjust their leverage simultaneously, as there would be few buyers for these assets among other banks, unless other cash-rich investors who do not rely on bank leverage to fund their positions emerge.
Evidence from bank balance sheet data confirms that the leverage of investment banks tends to be procyclical, with banks expending their leverage at the same time as they are expanding their assets (Fig. 16). The evidence on procyclicality of commercial banks – that is, banks that rely much more on retail deposits and whose main activities consist in making long-term, illiquid loans – is less uniform (Fig. 16). However, the evidence suggests commercial banks operating in more arm’s-length financial systems, that is, those where a greater share of financial intermediation relies on financial markets rather than on traditional relationship-based (and bank dominated) activities, also tend to be more procyclical (Fig. 17). Thus, more arm’s-length financial systems are associated with overall more procyclical bank behavior, and may be more vulnerable to banking stress. Moreover, as a proportion of all cases of banking-related financial stress, the share of more arm’s-length financial systems has remained about equal to that of more relationship-based systems (Table 1).

Indeed, although the duration of recessions is broadly similar across both types of financial systems, recessions tend to be somewhat deeper in economies with more arm’s-length financial systems (Fig. 18). The difference between growth rates in the first year after financial stress is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This implies that more arm’s-length systems may be subject to sharper contractions in activity following financial stress. One possible explanation could be that the leverage of a country’s banking system is more procyclical in arm’s-length systems.

Moreover, in recessions preceded by financial stress, the leverage of banks in more arm’s-length systems appears to fall more sharply than in other types of financial systems, albeit starting from a lower base (Fig. 19). This casts doubt on the presum-
tion that these systems are more likely to soften the blow from financial stress driven downturns of the economy thanks to the availability of the twin engines for financial intermediation (both banks and markets). However, contrasting experiences with economic cycles may also reflect divergences in other areas, notably in the degree of flexibility in labor and product markets and the social welfare systems, between economies characterized by arm’s-length as opposed to relationship-based financial systems (see Lall et al., 2006).

It is important to emphasize that while more arm’s-length financial systems are associated with sharper contractions in activity following banking stress, this does not imply that they are inherently more prone to such stress (see Table 1). Moreover, arm’s-length financial systems offer several advantages over relationship-based systems in terms of the reallocation of resources in response to changing economic opportunities (see Lall et al., 2006). However, as the current crisis underscores, the trend towards greater securitization in more arm’s-length systems – which was thought to permit portfolio diversification to overcome the cost of monitoring idiosyncratic risk inherent in traditional relationship-based systems – does not eliminate the need for banks and markets to independently assess the risk of their exposures. Indeed, lack of information about the value and risks of many securitized products and associated losses appears to have played a significant role in amplifying the current crisis.

5. Conclusions

Based on an index of financial stress, this paper has analyzed the experience of episodes of stress in banking, securities and foreign exchange markets, in 17 advanced economies over the past 30 years. The focus is on assessing the factors that determine the extent to which financial stress has affected economic activity.

This paper finds that financial stress is often, but not always a precursor to an economic slowdown or recession. A rapid expansion of credit, a run-up in house prices, and large borrowings by the corporate and household sectors all contribute to a higher likelihood that stress in the financial system will lead to more severe economic downturns. More specifically, when the financial cycle turns, as signaled by the onset of stress in financial markets, the likelihood that this will be followed by a downturn in economic activity is higher the larger are the initial financial imbalances (that is, the more exposed firms and households are to a decline in credit and asset prices). Banking stress in particular tends to lead to greater effects on activity, despite financial innovation that has increased the role of securities markets in many countries. In fact, recessions associated with banking-related financial stress take about five quarters to recover.

Why are banking-related financial stress episodes associated with the most severe downturns? This can be explained by the procyclicality of leverage, especially among investment banks, but also commercial banks in many countries. Indeed, countries whose financial systems are dominated by more arm’s-length-based transactions, as opposed to traditional relationship-based intermediation, tend to exhibit higher procyclical leverage, indicating that the amplifying role of financial systems in propagating shocks is more pronounced. As a result, when shocks affect core
financial institutions, the downturns that follow tend to be somewhat deeper in more arm’s-length financial systems. However, it should be emphasized that arm’s-length systems are not in general more prone to such shocks, and that such systems are better able to reallocate resources across various sectors of the economy in response to changing economic opportunities.

Given the role of build up in balance sheet vulnerabilities associated with rising asset prices and credit in explaining why some stress periods lead to downturns, policymakers need to be alert to these factors during the run-up of the financial cycle. Prudential measures as well as monetary policy should pay due regard to the vulnerabilities that may build up and that eventually lead to greater output losses if the financial system is hit by a severe shock.

In the event of significant financial stress that affects the core of the banking system, the early recognition of losses and measures to support the speedy restoration of capital can help reduce the output consequences of financial crises. At the same time, attention needs to be paid to the longer-term moral hazard implications of any strategy to restore financial stability.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Charles Collyns, Joerg Decressin, Tim Lane, Hyun Song Shin, Iftekhar Hasan (editor), and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Gavin Asdorian and Angela Espiritu for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF policy, or the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBT).

Appendix A. Data and methodology

A.1. The financial stress index

This section of the appendix describes the components and the methodology used to construct the FSI, with a particular emphasis on data sources. The FSI is an equal-variance-weighted average of seven variables, grouped into three categories.

A.2. Banking sector

- Banking sector β: covariance of the year-on-year percentage change of a country’s banking-sector equity index and its overall stock market index, divided by the variance of the year-on-year percentage change of the overall stock market index. Source: DataStream, Haver Analytics, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
- TED spread: 3-month LIBOR or commercial paper rate minus the government short-term rate. Source: Haver Analytics.
- Inverted term spread: government short-term rate minus government long-term rate. Source: DataStream and Haver Analytics.

A.3. Securities market

- Stock decline: stock index\(t-1\) minus stock index\(t\), then divided by the stock index\(t-1\). Source: OECD.
- Time-varying stock volatility: GARCH(1,1) volatility of overall stock market index monthly return. Source: OECD.

A.4. Foreign exchange

- Time-varying real effective exchange rate volatility: GARCH(1,1) volatility of real effective exchange rate monthly percent change. Source: IMF.

All components are originally in monthly frequency. The index is constructed by taking the average of the components after adjusting for the sample mean and standardizing by the sample standard deviation. Then, the index is rebased so that it ranges from 0 to 100. Finally, it is converted into quarterly frequency by taking the average of the monthly data. The FSI is available for 17 advanced countries from 1980. Data on long-term corporate bond yield for Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal were not available and were therefore excluded from the sample.

Episodes of financial stress are identified when the index is one standard deviation above its trend. Episodes that are only two quarters apart are considered one episode. To classify if an episode of financial stress is either due to banking, securities, or foreign exchange stress, we look at the change in the FSI from the quarter prior to the start of the episode to the maximum value of the FSI within the episode. If majority of the increase is due to the banking-sector components, then the FSI is classified as banking. The same rule applies if the change is mostly due to the securities markets components or the foreign exchange component. Additionally, if banking contributes at least one-third of the change in the FSI, then the episode is also classified as “banking-related”.

A.5. The cost of capital

The cost of capital used in the paper is defined as a weighted average of the real cost of bank loans, the real cost of debt, and real cost of equity. All components are monthly data. The real cost of equity is on extension of a standard dividend discount model and derived using a model specified in Box 2 on page 76 of the November 2004 ECB Monthly Bulletin. Using available data for the other variables, the real cost of capital, \( r_t \), can be calculated using the following equation:

\[
P_t = \frac{D_t[(1 + g) + \beta(g^{\text{res}} - g)]}{h_t - g}
\]

where \( P_t \) = real stock price, \( D_t \) = the current level of real dividends, \( g^{\text{res}} = 1/B/E/S \) long-term earnings-per-share growth forecast minus Consensus long-term inflation forecast, \( g = \) long-term growth rate of real corporate earnings, assumed constant at 2.5 percent.

The overall cost of capital is calculated as a weighted average of these three components with the weights defined (respectively) as loans, debt, and equity as shares of non-financial corporate liabilities from the OECD national accounts data.
A.6. Bankscope data

Two datasets were constructed using annual bank-level data obtained from the Bankscope database. The first dataset included only investment banks as classified by the Bankscope database (“Investment Bank/Securities House”). The second dataset, referenced in the paper as commercial banks, included banks with the following Bankscope classifications: commercial bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, real estate/mortgage bank, and medium- & long-term credit bank.

A.7. Sample of banks

- Investment banks: the sample of banks contained banks that were in the top 50 investment banks globally by total assets in one or more years from 1988 to 2007.
- Commercial banks: the sample of banks consisted of those banks that were in the top 10 banks (top 30 banks for the United Kingdom and Japan, top 50 banks for the United States) by total assets for each country in one or more years from 1988 to 2007. Also included were any banks that were acquired by or that merged with a top 10 bank. (See below for an explanation of accounting for mergers and acquisition.)

The number of commercial banks per country used in the sample was chosen to provide a representative sample of banking activity within each country. The following table summarizes the average share of total bank assets (as reported by OECD) per year represented by the banks in the sample:

A.8. Consolidated versus unconsolidated balance sheets

- Investment banks: data from consolidated statements were used for investment banks. If consolidated data were unavailable, data from unconsolidated statements were used.
- Commercial banks: in order to isolate as much as possible the domestic activities of commercial banks, unconsolidated bank data were used for commercial banks in the sample. If unconsolidated statements were unavailable, data from consolidated data were used.
- Data from multiple statements for the same bank were combined to form a single set of bank-level data if the statement types (consolidated or unconsolidated) were the same. In addition, the data were cleaned (by country, in the case of commercial banks) by excluding observations where the growth rate of total assets was above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile.

A.9. Mergers and acquisitions

For consistency, banks that were acquired by or that merged with banks included in the original sample set were also included in the dataset. For years prior to a merger or acquisition, the banks involved were treated as separate banks; for years subsequent to a merger or acquisition, the bank resulting from the merger or acquisition was naturally a single bank in the database. In order to calculate level changes or growth rates of a bank in the year of a merger or acquisition, a data point was constructed for the year prior to the merger or acquisition by summing the data values of the banks involved in the merger or acquisition.

References


